Between September and November 2011, Thailand experienced its worst flooding in modern history. Central Thailand was severely affected by flooding, which resulted in the closure of more than 30 hospitals in the region. Lack of evidencebased practices, limited resources, and the inexperience of infection control preventionists (ICPs) were obstacles to prioritizing investment in infection control (IC) measures after flooding. We conducted a survey to evaluate hospital flood preparedness (HFP) in central Thailand and to guide future HFP plans.
On January 6, 2012, a workshop entitled "Hospital Preparedness for Flooding" was conducted with faculty from the Division of Infectious Diseases of Thammasat University (Pathumthani, Thailand) and Washington University (St. Louis, Missouri). All 104 secondary care hospitals (1100 beds) and tertiary care hospitals (1250 beds) in 15 central Thailand provinces were invited to participate on the basis of a hospital list from the Thailand Ministry of Public Health. Of these, 72 hospitals (69%) attended the workshop. A survey of HFP plans was distributed to an ICP or a hospital epidemiologist (HE) at each participating hospital. The survey instrument assessed ICP, HE, and hospital characteristics; HFP; institutional safety culture; and administration support to resolve flood-related problems. 1, 2 This survey instrument was pilottested by 10 IC experts, including ICPs and HEs, to ensure its validity, reliability, and acceptability. The administration support was categorically ranked as poor, fair, good, very good, and excellent. The institutional safety culture was measured by safety score (a detailed description is provided in Table 1 ). A higher safety score indicated greater safety centeredness.
1,2 Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS, version 15 (SPSS). Adjusted odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals were calculated by logistic regression to determine factors associated with each HFP protocol and plan.
Of the 72 hospitals that attended the workshop, 72 (100%) consented to study participation and responded to the survey. The median age of the responding ICPs and HEs was 44 years (range, 24-56 years). Eighty-nine percent of the respondents (64 of 72) were ICPs, and 11% (8 of 72) were HEs. The median amount of time that the respondents had been in their current position was 7 years (range, 0.3-27 years). Characteristics of the hospitals, HFP plans, extent of flood-related damage, and infection control problems are summarized in Table 1 . Of the 72 hospitals, 27 (38%) had received flood damage. The median institutional safety score was 8.7 (range, 6-10). Although the majority of the participating hospitals had an HFP protocol (92%), only 52% had exercises to test their flood protocols. During and after the flooding, significant proportions of the hospitals surveyed had plans for opening flood-unaffected units for use (89%), had surge capacity planning (79%), had protocols to help hospital personnel and their families (76%), had plans to stockpile personal protective equipment (PPE; 75%), and had plans for operating a laboratory unit (67%; Table 1 ). Notably, only 51% had plans for operating an isolation unit, and 32% had environmental cleaning and mold remediation protocols. By multivariate analysis, being a tertiary care hospital was associated with having an HFP protocol ( ) and having P p .05 a plan for opening flood-unaffected units for use during and after flooding ( ), whereas having an institutional P p .05 safety score of 10 was associated with having practiced an exercise drill for flood protocol ( ), having a plan for P p .006 adequate PPE stockpile ( ), and having a cleaning P p .007 and mold remediation protocol and a plan for operation of laboratory units during and after flooding ( ). P p .04 Among the 27 hospitals that experienced flood damage, the median duration of flooding was 30 days (range, 7-60 days), the median duration of hospital renovation (with units open in service at reduced capacity) was 45 days (range, 7-60 days), and 63% (17 of 27 hospitals) reported good-to-excellent hospital administration support ( Table 1 ). The major flood-related IC problems cited by hospitals that underwent flooding included no containment of mold-contaminated areas during clean up and demolition (85%), no air sampling to assess fungal bioburden (67%), unavailability of HEPA filtration in flooded units during demolition (63%), and no mold remediation protocol (56%).
Although the majority of surveyed hospitals (92%) had a flood protocol, only 52% had conducted any exercises to test their protocols. These data are consistent with earlier studies of hospital disaster preparedness in various settings. 3, 4 Our survey highlighted the need for national education on environmental decontamination, mold remediation, and isolation unit operation after flooding, which deserves further evaluation in resource-limited settings. 5 Because Thailand had previously been affected by an outbreak of avian influenza and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the high response rates for several aspects of hospital disaster preparedness (eg, stockpiling of PPE and plans for surge capacity and operation of laboratory units) were not surprising. 6, 7 Finally, our study emphasizes the role of a "safety culture" in a hospital as a strong predictor for HFP plans in this middle-income country.
There are some limitations to this study. With a 69% response rate, our results have some susceptibility to nonresponse bias. If the 32 hospitals (31%) that did not respond to the survey were systematically different from the 72 hospitals that did respond, generalization of our results to nonparticipating Thai hospitals and hospitals in other countries may not be possible. We relied on self-reported data from note. Data are no. (%) of hospitals, unless otherwise indicated. HEPA, high-efficiency particulate air; PPE, personal protective equipment. a The institutional safety score was defined as the average of responses regarding agreement to 2 statements about safety (ie, "Leadership is driving us to be a safety-centered institution" and "I would feel safe being treated here as a patient"). The statements are based on a conceptual model that seemed to best represent the elements of safety culture for the issue under study and our outcomes of interest. 1,2 Both statements were scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The sum of the scores from both statements was the safety score, which ranges from 2 to 10. b Includes emergency department, intensive care units, hemodialysis units, laboratory department, isolation unit, operating room, blood bank, endoscopy suite, nutrition department, laundry department, and pharmacy and engineer department. c Units open in service at reduced capacity. d 1 USD p 30 baht. e The administration support was defined by a composite response to staffing, financial, and political aspects from hospital administration.
ICPs and HEs from each hospital to determine HFP. It is possible that an individual respondent may have overstated or understated how frequently HFP plans were used; however, we have no reason to believe that this would be a systematic issue. Finally, the small sample size might limit detection of other factors associated with HFP planning.
In conclusion, we provide an important first step that suggests opportunities to develop national guidelines on HFP that emphasize issues relevant to environmental decontamination, mold remediation, isolation, and surge capacity after flooding. 8 Additional studies that rigorously evaluate such strategies would help bolster HFP efforts in developing countries and elsewhere. 
